Conflicts between Fulani Herders and Farmers in Central and Southern Nigeria: Discourse on Proposed Establishment of Grazing Routes and Reserves

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Abstract

Due to climate change, to massive land acquisitions by capitalist farmers, and mainly, to the perpetuation of the pastoral way of life in Nigeria, there has been a great increase in the presence of Fulani herders in central and southern Nigeria. This has resulted in frequent conflicts between the herders and farming communities. To deal with this problem, legislators from the northern region of Nigeria are seeking to acquire lands in all the states of Nigeria for the establishment of grazing routes and reserves for Fulani herders. This
This paper examines this issue. Among other things, the paper disputes the reasons adduced by northerners and other interests in support of the bill, and insists that cattle breeding in Nigeria must become a sedentary occupation.

Key words: conflicts, grazing routes and reserves, pastoralism, ranching.

Introduction

There is an ongoing grassroots war in the central and southern states of Nigeria between Fulani herdsmen and farming communities. It is an old age problem, but it has escalated in the last decade and has assumed a very deadly dimension. The conflicts occur when Fulani herdsmen move into non-Fulani homelands with their cattle. This usually leads to the destruction of farmers’ crops. Thus, the herdsmen provoke their victims to acts of resistance (preventing entry into farms, killing or stealing cattle, or poisoning fields). In response, the herdsmen wage deadly attacks on farming communities. One of the recent proposals meant to address this problem is in the form of a bill at the National Assembly of Nigeria seeking to establish grazing routes and reserves for Fulani herdsmen in all the states of the country. This paper therefore deals with the conflicts between Fulani herdsmen and farming communities in Nigeria, and focuses on the legislative effort to create grazing routes and reserves in the country. It begins with a brief introduction of the Fulani. This is followed by a literature review. Then the paper dwells on the bill to establish grazing routes and reserves in the country.

The area covered by this paper is the Federal Republic of Nigeria. More space is devoted to central and southern Nigeria, where the conflicts between herders and farming communities have been most bloody. The sources of the essay are mainly media reports. A few academic publications are mentioned in the literature review. They are
used to provide context and perspective. Besides, this author lives in Nigeria: he has a firsthand experience of the subject of this essay.

The Fulani

The Fulani is an ethnic group of the West African savannah. Some of them live in towns and cities, and engage in farming and trading. A large proportion of them are cattle herders. Through the series of events called the Fulani jihads, the Fulani conquered a greater part of the area that later became Northern Nigeria between 1804 and 1810 (Horton, 1972; Adeleye, 1971; Last, 1967). Among the places they did not conquer were many places in central Nigeria, in present-day Plateau, Benue, Taraba, Nasarawa and Kogi states. In many of these places, in the words of Reuben Udo, “hill sites provided adequate refugee outposts for people fleeing from the onslaught of mounted Fulani warriors”. The fate of other savannah areas in central Nigeria, especially those that lacked the protection of hills, was much worse. With the advantages of cavalry and unity, the Fulani routinely raided them for slaves. The frequency and depredations of Fulani slave raids helped to make central Nigeria, despite its vast farming lands, one of the sparsely populated regions of Nigeria (Udo, 1980, pp.22-23).

The British conquered northern Nigeria in the first decade of the twentieth century. Thus, they brought an end to Fulani rule in the area and to their depredations in central Nigeria. An important policy of the British conquerors was, in the words of Udo (1980), “the fixing of boundaries between the various ethnic groups as well as between clans and villages”. He added that the fixing of boundaries “brought an end to the practice whereby … groups which were powerful enough could forcibly encroach upon the land of neighbouring groups” (p.24).

Literature Review

There are several works that deal with cattle herding in Africa, some with emphasis on the Fulani (Roger Blench, 1994; Isah Mohammed Abbas, 2010; and Olarewaju Ifatimehin & Marietu Tenuche, 2009). Some organizations have also written on the subject. They include the
African Union, AU (2010), the Food and Agricultural Organization, FAO, and the International Institute for Environment and Development, IIED (http://www.iied.org/). Roger Blench makes the revealing point that cost considerations, particularly the desire to fatten their herds close to their markets, constitute a major reason why the Fulani now graze large proportions of their cattle in central and southern Nigeria. That is also the finding of the FAO: that pastoralism persists because it is cheaper than sedentary breeding of livestock. Abbas points out that climate change and land acquisitions by capitalist farmers are other reasons why Fulani herders have moved southwards in search of grazing lands, and, consequently, why they often come into conflict with farming communities.

On the whole, the existing literature on pastoralism supports pastoralists, portraying them as a marginalized community. Concerning the conflicts between farmers and herders, they generally recommend accommodation with herders - farmers giving up lands to herders and government protecting this “right”.

The Bill on Grazing Routes and Reserves

There is a bill at the Nigerian Senate, one of the two houses of the country’s National Assembly, entitled “A Bill for an Act to provide for the Establishment, Preservation and Control of National Grazing Reserves and Livestock Routes and the Creation of National Grazing Reserve Commission and for purposes connected therewith”, sponsored by Mrs. Zaynab Kure (Niger South). There is a similar bill being considered at the House of Representatives, the other house of the National Assembly. The sponsors and other backers of bill - legislators from northern Nigeria—are seeking that power be granted to a federal commission to acquire lands from all the state governments in Nigeria and the Minster of the Federal Capital Territory to establish grazing routes and reserves for Fulani herders. Subject to the directives of the commission, Fulani herdsmen would have a right to such lands, despite the wishes of the owners, and
despite the wishes of the government of any state. The Senate and House of Representatives debated the bill in early August 2013. The bill was opposed by legislators from southern Nigeria, and some from central Nigeria. Besides, several associations representing the interests of different ethnic groups in southern and central Nigeria have publicly opposed the bill. They include the Ijaw National Congress, the Federation of Middle Belt Peoples, Afenifere (a Yoruba organization), the Movement for the Survival of Ukwuani People and the Southern Kaduna in Diaspora (Nzeshi, 2013; The Sun, 2013).

Case for the Bill

The express reason is that the cattle herders need pasture for their cattle. The exponents of the bill argue that, largely due to desertification and overgrazing, grazing lands in the home states of the Fulani are much less than in the past and the remaining ones are fast diminishing. Hence, the Fulani have found it necessary to move southwards to seek pasture. In the course of doing so, the argument continues, they have often come into conflict with farming communities, and, consequently, have often lost large numbers of their herd. To prevent such conflicts from reoccurring, the sponsors of the bill want the federal government to designate grazing routes and reserves in non-Fulani communities for the Fulani. Thus, Fulani herders can graze along the routes and in the reserves as of right, without getting into conflict with other Nigerian groups.

Many newspaper columnists and leader writers, and even leaders of non-Fulani states where there are frequent conflicts between herdsmen and farmers (like those of Kogi and Benue states), support this proposal. Some do so because they want to advance the interests of the Fulani. These are usually Fulani writers, like Ishaq Modibbo Kawu (2012). Others, especially leaders of the Governors of Benue and Kogi states, are merely concerned to have peace in their states and, thus, are prepared to sacrifice the interests of landowners for that
Case against the Bill

The main reason for opposing this bill is that it would deprive other peoples of their lands—lands they would like to use for other purposes, lands they would like their children to inherit. It is important to note that southern Nigeria has much less land than northern Nigeria and that its population density is much higher than the north’s. It is likely that, once entrenched on reserves, the Fulani would seek to acquire more and, contrary to the express purpose of the bill, will get into more conflicts with non-Fulani owners of the lands. The above scenario is based on the facts and ideas in the remaining paragraphs of this sub-heading.

Despite the adoption of the idea and practice of permanent ethnic ownership of land in the country by the British government and the post-colonial Nigerian state, there has been a southward expansion, since the early twentieth century, of areas where the Fulani are now co-owners and politically dominant. To consolidate their control, the Hausa-Fulani have been putting much political and economic pressure on the indigenes to convert to Islam. In the first half of the 1960s, Ahmadu Bello, Premier of Northern Nigeria, embarked on several campaigns in central Nigeria that were meant to convert “pagans” to Islam (Crampton, 1979, pp. 80-84 & Paden, 1986, pp.566-578).

The gradual southwards expansion of the Hausa-Fulani is responsible for on-going ethno-religious conflicts in the central states of Nigeria, but to a greater extent in Plateau, Nasarawa and Benue States. In Plateau State, the conflicts between herders and farmers is co-extensive with the conflicts over indigeneship in the state, especially between the predominantly Muslim Hausa and Fulani, on the one hand, and the predominantly Christian Berom (also spelt Birom) in the area around the state capital, Jos. The latter claim ownership of the land; the latter insist they are also indigenes. Tensions between the Hausa and different Christian communities in Plateau State eventuated...
into bloody conflicts in September 2001 and early May 2004, and resulted in the declaration of a state of emergency in the state on 18 May 2004 (http://www.irinnews.org/report/49927/nigeria-obasanjo-declares-state-of-emergency-in-plateau-state & en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fidelis_Tapgun). These conflicts were essentially between the city-dwelling Hausa and the Berom. In the last few years, the conflict spread to the rural areas and the Fulani became the major enemies of the Berom. The conflicts have become bloodier since then. The following headlines contain accounts of some of the conflicts from late to mid-2013: “Fulani herdsmen kill 3, raze 12 houses in Plateau” (Nigerian Tribune, June 8, 2013); “Villagers flee as Fulani herdsmen invade Plateau community” (The Punch, June 3, 2013); and “About 20 killed in Plateau State over Cattle Theft” (http://www.channelstv.com/home/2013/06/28/about-20-killed-in-plateau-state-over-cattle-theft/).

As stated above, conflicts between Fulani herders and farming communities have been common in Benue and Nasarawa States. In Nasarawa, some of conflicts are also co-extensive with conflicts over claims to indigeneship between the Fulani and farming communities. The following headlines, each of which deals with an event that occurred between 2011 and August 2013, illustrate the frequency and extent of these conflicts. They are: “Flash! Nasarawa: Fulani Herdsmen Allegedly Kill 16, Destroy Houses In Shooting Spree” (News Byte, August 1, 2013), “Fulani Herdsmen Kill 3, Burn Houses in Nasarawa” (http://flashynewsnaija.blogspot.com/2013/07/fulani-herdsmen-kill-3-burn-houses-in.html, retrieved on August 17, 2013), and “5000 Flee As Fulani Herdsmen Attack Benue And Nassarawa” (http://www.nairaland.com/815595/5000-flee-fulani-herdsmen-attack, Others are: “Fulani herdsmen kill 34 in Benue” (The Vanguard, July 8, 2012); “Fulani herdsmen strike again, kill two, kidnap others in Benue” (Daily Post, May 23, 2013, http://dailypost.com.ng/2013/05/25/fulani-herdsmen-strike-again-kill-two-kidnap-others-in-benue/; “Suspected Fulani Herdsmen Kill 12 in Benue” (ThisDay, June 2, 2013); “20 feared killed as Fulani

It is important to note that those responsible for the killings are not brought to justice. It is important to note, too, that the herders are not forced to return to their own states of origin after these massacres. They remain where they have killed the owners of the land, and remain above the law.

Southern Nigeria is also being constantly menaced by Fulani herdsmen. In nearly every state in the region, Fulani herdsmen graze where they like, destroy crops, block traffic, rape women, beat up hunters, and, not too infrequently, wage deadly armed attacks on villages where there is the slightest resistance to their depredations. Like in central Nigeria, Fulani herdsmen are becoming a dreaded group—a minority that intimidates the majority: a minority that the majority is organizationally powerless to confront.

The daring of the Fulani is illustrated by the following brief accounts:

Fulani herdsmen, accompanied by several prominent Fulani men, invaded Government House, Ibadan, in 2000. Led by Mohammadu Buhari (a former military head of state), bus loads of Fulani thugs stormed the seat of power at Ibadan and virtually took Governor Lam Adesina hostage. They accused the Governor of masterminding the killing of Fulani herdsmen in the Saki area of the state. Buhari and his thugs later left in peace, after they were convinced that it was their kinsmen that provoked the conflict and actually killed far more Yoruba than the latter killed Fulani men (“How Lam prevented another civil war”, 2012 The Nation, November 18. http://thenationonlineng.net/new/news/how-l -prevented-another-civil-war/).
In July 2012, women from Ubima, in Ikwerre Local Government Area of the state (Governor Amaechi’s hometown) staged a demonstration at Government House, Port Harcourt. They alleged that Fulani herders in their area had been destroying their crops, constantly raping women on the farms, and beating up their hunters. An aide to the Governor promised that the state government would investigate the matter (*Nigerian Newsworld*, 16 July 2012, http://www.nigeriannewsworld.com/content/under-attack-hoodlums, retrieved on August 17, 2013).


In the last example cited above, the reporter stated that vigilante groups had been formed in several communities in Delta State to resist attacks by Fulani herdsmen. “Unfortunately”, he added, “they seem not to be able to match the firepower of these herdsmen”. The report also reveals that the Nigeria Police is trying to conceal the enormity of the pillages of the Fulani in southern Nigeria. The person that was interviewed in the *Vanguard* report was the newspaper’s foreign affairs editor, Mr. Hugo Odiogor. He was a victim of a highway robbery attack by Fulani herdsmen on the road from Ogwashi-Ukwu to Asaba. What is revealing in his interview was the attempt by the Police to prevent him from stating that Fulani herdsmen had carried out the attack. In his own words:
But at the station [in Asaba], I was warned not to say that the robbers were of Fulani extraction, that there was a serious effort by security agencies to conceal the fact that the perpetrators of the crime were from [the] Northern part of the country.

According to Odiogor’s account, the Police in Asaba later told him to make his report at the Police station in Ogwashi Ukwu, the station responsible for security in the area where the robbery occurred. There, he continued, “for the second time, I was asked not to describe the robbers as Fulani herdsmen”. The conclusion to be drawn from this attempt to conceal the identity of the robbers is that the Police was not going to seek to arrest them.

Opposition to the bill took the form of newspaper editorials, articles and comments on the online versions of the articles published by newspapers. One of the profound articles was published in ThisDay, one of the country’s leading newspapers. Written by Onuora Nzeshi (2013) and entitled “Grazing Reserves Bill: The Challenges Ahead”, the paper gave the highlights of the House of Representatives bill and added a trenchant critique of it. He cited a lecture by Dr. Emmanuel Onucheyo (2001), who wrote:

The nomadic system was appropriate when human and animal populations were small and land was huge, just as the system of shifting cultivation was appropriate. But over the last couple of decades, populations of both have exploded, fallow periods have been drastically reduced and weather patterns have changed.

Nzeshi added:

[C]hange is a constant thing and if there is anything that should change in Nigeria, it is the culture of primitive pastoralism. It is neither good for the cattle
nor for the nomads. It is … a threat to national security.

Among the newspapers that wrote editorials on the bill for the establishment of grazing routes and reserves was *The Sun* (August 6, 2013). It called it “this inciting bill”. The paper added: “[t]his bill is vexatious [and] is not deserving of consideration by any serious legislative house in this 21st century”. Such are the view of the opponents of the bill.

**Further Critique of the Rationality on the Bill**

It is conceded that desertification has crept into the northern fringes of Nigeria. But the extent has not been so substantial as to significantly disrupt farming and cattle production. There is still enough arable land in the states where the Fulani are indigenes to rear all the cattle in the country. The situation is not yet as grave as in Niger or Chad—which, despite having more severe problems of drought and desertification, still export cattle and beans to Nigeria.

Concerning the encroachment on grazing lands and the acquisition of virgin lands by farmers, this writer is also willing to make another concession. There are indeed clashes between farmers and herdsmen in northern Nigeria. Capitalist farmers are also acquiring vast lands for farming in the region. But this is a problem of the Fulani elite, as well as those of the Hausa and Kanuri, have the power to address in their different hometown, local government areas and states. The bulk of the leaders in states where the Fulani are indigenes—emirs, local government chairmen, and state governors—are Fulani. The Fulani are among the leading capitalist farmers of the region. They include Governor Murtala Nyako of Adamawa State (see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Murtala_Nyako.. Given their positions and given, too, that the Fulani elite own large proportions of the cattle bred reared by Fulani herders, the herders can only blame their own people if they are marginalized in northern Nigeria. They have no moral or political justification to terrorize other regions to make up for
the deprivations effected by their own leaders. By the same token, the other regions are not under any moral or political obligation to give lands to Fulani herders to make up for the grazing lands seized by their own (Fulani) leaders.

It is pertinent to add here that despite encroachments by crop farmers and despite acquisitions by capitalist farmers, there is adequate land in northern Nigeria for both crop farming and cattle production, even beyond the present levels of production. Desertification is yet to reach most of the states where the Fulani are indigenes. They include Niger, Kebbi, Kaduna, Gombe, Adamawa, Bauchi and Taraba. The territorial extent of these states is great—more than enough to support all the cattle produced in Nigeria today. Indeed, the idea that grazing lands are inadequate in the north contradicts the widely held view (which is valid) the north’s potential as a food producing area is yet to be realized—that, aside from producing more per each unit of land, much of the land in the region is yet to be utilized for food production (Sani, 2012; (“Nupe Day Lecture: Nupe Land Can Feed West Africa – CBN Gov‖, 2013). Views about the agricultural potentials of southern Nigeria are not as ambitious as these.

Rather than inadequacy of grazing land, the reason for Fulani herding in central and southern Nigeria is to cut costs: to minimize transport costs by taking their cattle closer to cattle markets. Fulani herders can find grazing lands in their states of origin if pressured to do so.

**Alternative to Grazing Routes and Reserves**

The problem of allocating arable land for crop farming and livestock production is an age old one. In much of the rest of the world, it has been addressed by doing precisely what the AU and IIED experts oppose: compelling herders to abandon the pastoral way of life—making cattle as well as sheep breeding a sedentary occupation. This was one of the major achievements of the agricultural revolution in Europe. With enclosures, lands for crop farming and animal farming
were separated, and land was used more efficiently for both crop and livestock production.

It is the position of this paper that, rather than create grazing routes and reserves for Fulani herders outside their states of origin, the federal and, more importantly, the state governments of Fulani states should make livestock production a sedentary occupation. They should ranches in Fulani states and on lands owned or leased (not seized) by the Fulani and confine cattle breeding within the enclosed areas.

As envisaged by this author, each ranch would contain grazing fields, and, especially in arid areas, artificial sources of water, like boreholes, dams, canals, and aqueducts supplying water from rivers and lakes. Pasture is usually inadequate on large ranches. The problem is addressed in the world today by bringing cattle feed from outside. Cattle feed that is brought into ranches from outside is usually produced by crop farmers. As stated by William Pardee (2008):

Forage-crop farming serves as the basis for much of the world’s livestock industries. Forage crops are mowed, dried, and stored as hay; chopped and stored wet as silage; or fed directly to cattle as pasture or as freshly chopped forage.

Forage-crop or hay farming is a major farming activity in many countries. In the United States, 26 million hectares of cropland was used for the production of hay at the beginning of the twenty-first century. Corn is the only crop in the country that is produced in a larger total area (32 million hectares). Slightly less land (25 million hectares) is used to produce wheat (“Agriculture”. Microsoft® Encarta®, 2008).

As stated above, northern Nigeria is not lacking in arable land. Thus, it can profitably engage in forage-crop farming on a large-scale. Indeed, it has the potential to produce enough forage for domestic consumption and export.
Conclusion

The findings of this research effort show that Fulani herdsmen have considerably extended their system of livestock production in central and southern Nigeria, with the result that there are incessant bloody conflict between them and farming communities in these regions. The AU, IIED and some academics are of the view that pastoralists are a marginalized group of people and urge governments to help de-marginalize them. Our findings indicate that, in Nigeria, the marginalization of pastoralists is due partly to their desire to continue their way of life and to land acquisitions by fellow Fulbe people and others (mainly the Hausa) who share the same states of origin with them—places where the pastoralists have claim to land on the basis of conquest and occupation before the British established the principle of permanent ownership of land by communities. An attempt was made here to establish that, despite the acquisition of much grazing land by both capitalist and peasant farms, there is still much land left for grazing in the home states of the herdsmen. Thus, by insisting on extending pastoralism to non-Fulani states in central and southern Nigeria, and the National Assembly trying to facilitate this, the interests of groups that are not responsible for the plight of the herdsmen are being threatened.

It is not conceivable that Fulani herdsmen will voluntarily give up their way of life. It seems likely that opposition from interests in central and southern Nigeria will prevent the passage of the bill for the establishment of grazing routes and reserves. There is no indication that the federal government and the governments of the states of northern Nigeria can muster the political will to compel the herdsmen to make cattle breeding a sedentary occupation. Thus, it is reasonable to expect the escalation of conflicts between herdsmen and farmers in central and southern Nigeria in the near future. The matter can only be resolved, one way or the other, when the consequences of not doing so can no longer be ignored—when conflicts between herdsmen and farmers severely threaten, not just the peace, but the stability of Nigeria.
References


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